by Wilfried Heink-
By the term “Action Reinhard(t),” official historiography refers to the (alleged) mass murder of Jews in three German camps: Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka. Some, ahem, historians include Chelmno, but I am using an article by Dieter Pohl, “Massentötung durch Giftgas im Rahmen der ‘Aktion Reinhardt’. Aufgaben der Forschung” (Mass murder by poisonous gas during “Action Reihardt.” Assignment for researchers) as a guideline, and he mentions only three camps. His article appeared on pp. 185-195 in “Neue Studien zu Nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas”, published by Günter Morsch and Bertrand Perz, Metropol Verlag Berlin, 2011—the most recent ‘industry publication’. This book is the result of a conference of May 2008 in Berlin, which was attended by 200 scientists from many countries. The intent was to present new material to help combat revisionists, who, to this day, deny the mass murder by poisonous gasses of millions of Jews in gas chambers. The book is a declaration of “Holocaust” bankruptcy.
But, as my title suggests, the spelling of the name of the action differs: In some publications we read “Reinhard,” in others “Reinhardt.” Why is that? Pohl claims in his article that 1.35 million people (he writes Menschen) were killed during this action: according to him, about one quarter of all Jews killed (here he writes Jews), about half by poisonous gasses. “Action Reinhard(t)” thus refers to an enormous crime, and one would expect exactitude in research, beginning with the spelling of the name.
It might be possible to dismiss the “Reinhardt” vs. “Reinhard” issue as a simple spelling error – albeit an unlikely scenario, for surely “historians” are not that sloppy – if it were not for the reference to Fritz Reinhardt of the finance ministry by Messrs Morsch and Perz in “Neue Studien…”, p. XVII, footnote 11. They write:
“…Die von der unterschiedlichen Schreibweise des Namens „Reinhard“ und „Reinhardt“ in den Quellen ausgelöste Kontroverse über die Frage, ob sich die Bezeichnung „Aktion Reinhard(t)“ auf Reinhard Heydrich oder möglicherweise auf Staatssekretär Fritz Reinhardt im Reichsfinanzministerium bezog, ist mittlerweile entschieden. Die Bezeichnung geht tatsächlich auf Heydrichs Vornamen zurück, der allerdings in den Zeitgenössischen Quellen selbst teilweise fälschlich mit Reinhart geschrieben wurde…“
(Roughly: The controversy concerning writing “Reinhard” or “Reinhardt”, referring to either Heydrich’s first name or that of Fritz Reinhardt of the finance ministry, has been settled. The description goes indeed back to Heydrich’s first name, spelled erroneously at times as Reinhardt.)
Messrs. Morsch and Perz are unclear as to who settled the issue, although they cite sources. But if this was just a spelling matter, and if “Aktion Reinhard(t)” was conceived by Reinhard Heydrich as a ‘Jew killing action’, why even mention Fritz Reinhardt? I am sure Morsch et al. know more about this, but what they know will just not fit into the narrative. Economics did play a role, and after looking at the issue closely, it is apparent that this action was initiated by the finance ministry, by Fritz Reinhardt, and that Reinhard Heydrich had nothing to do with it. His role was appended to the story later on by shysters, who refer to themselves as “historians”.
But before addressing this issue, a little about what Herr Pohl wrote. By stating up front that 1.35 million people were killed during this action, he follows what Julius Wellhausen dismisses as shysterism, to put it bluntly, when he writes:
“Für die Deutung werden die Thatsachen vorsausgesetzt und aus der Deutung werden sie bewiesen“(Die Pharisäer und Sadducäer, 1. Auflage Verlag Bamberg, Greifswald 1874. My copy Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1967, p.66). What he writes is – and Wellhausen is referring to biblical scholars here – that for the interpretation of an event, in this case “The Holocaust”, the event is established as fact up front, and substantiated through the interpretation. In other words, that which should be investigated, “The Holocaust”, is established as fact and substantiated by the interpretations of what is accepted as ‘evidence’. That research into this “action” is lacking, to put it mildly, Pohl confirms:
“Die Hintergründe dieses Massenmordes sind bis heute nicht völlig durchleuchtet.“ (p. 185)
(Trans: The background as to why this mass murder took place has not clearly been established to this day.)
Pohl wrote this after he softened his readers up with tales of gruesome mass murder, including the murder of children, but then admits later that we still don’t know why it happened. Clear indications of the Wellhausen syndrome: one must believe in mass murder, dismissing essentials. As an aside, on December 19 of this year (2011), an article appeared in Die Welt, a German daily, titled: “Hitler gab nicht “den” Befehl zum Holocaust” (Hitler did not issue the Holocaust order). The author, Felix Kellerhoff, writes that between 5.26 and 6.1 million Jews were killed and then continues:
“Obwohl diese Tatsachen unverrückbar feststehen, gibt es eines nicht: den einen schriftlichen Befehl Adolf Hitlers, mit dem das Jahrhundertverbrechen angeordnet worden ist. In keiner Akte ist dieses Dokument aufgetaucht, es gibt kein Zitat daraus und nicht einmal halbwegs verlässliche Zeugenaussagen, wann diese Weisung ergangen sein soll.”
(Even though [mass murder] is a fact, one thing we don’t have: a written order by Hitler to commit the crime of the century. In no file has this document been found: we have no citation of it and no reliable witness testimony as to when this instruction was issued.)
Quite an admission! He tries to explain why nothing resembling an order or plan has ever been found, while still asserting that “The Holocaust” happened:
“…dass der Holocaust nicht auf eine zentrale Weisung Hitlers zurückging, sondern sich zwischen Sommer 1941 und Frühjahr 1942 schrittweise entwickelte”.
(…the Holocaust was not based on a centralized instruction by Hitler, but instead developed step by step between the summer of 1941 and the spring of 1942.)
To claim that this “crime of the century,” the alleged plan to murder between 5.26 and 6.1 million Jews, developed on its own is nonsense, pure desperation. But this article is a topic on its own; thus, back to Pohl. He continues on about the deportation of Jews, the establishment of ghettos, that many died/were killed, and that mass murder was already happening on Soviet territory after the war against the S.U. commenced. Then the National Socialist leadership decided, perhaps in September 1941, to conduct mass murder outside Soviet territory as well. On p. 186 we read:
“Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach am 13. Oktober 1941 beauftragte SS-Chef Heinrich Himmler deshalb den SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin, Odilo Globocnik, eine solche Mordaktion im GG zu organisieren. Vermutlich wurde dieser regionale SS-Führer beauftragt, weil er besonders gute Kontakte zu Himmler pflegte, selbst mit Siedlungsplanungen auftrat und weil er als besonders rücksichtslos galt und schon zahlreiche Verbrechen begangen hatte”.
(It is most likely that on October 13, 1941, SS-Chief Heinrich Himmler instructed the head of the Lublin district SS and police, Odilo Globocnik, to organize a murder action in the general government. This SS leader was most likely picked because of his good [close] contacts to Himmler, involvement in settlement planning—known for his ruthlessness.)
One needs to read this slowly: It is possible that Globocnik was picked on October 13, 1941, allegedly because of his “good” contacts to Himmler. We don’t know exactly when Globocnik was chosen, but he was possibly picked because Himmler liked him: renowned German efficiency in its finest form.
We then learn that between the end of the 1970s and the mid-1990s advances were made in research into the so-called (sogenannten) Action Reinhardt (he continues to write it with “dt”) extermination camps, referring to “Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen…”, a 1983 publication by Kogon/Langbein/Rückerl and a book he authored with Musial. The Kogon et al. book does nothing to establish mass murder allegations as fact, as no investigation reports by experts in the field of crime investigations are mentioned, i.e. none exist: everything is based on innuendo and circumstance. Pohl admits it when he writes (p. 187):
“Die Forschungen stoßen vor allem durch den Mangel an aussagekräftigen Quellen an Grenzen. Im Gegensatz zu den Konzentrationslagern sind für die Lager der „Aktion Reinhardt” fast keine zeitgenössischen Akten überliefert. Letztere wurden schon im Herbst 1943 fast vollständig vernichtet, die Lagerinstallationen komplett abgebaut …Deshalb stützt sich die Geschichtswissenschaft fast durchweg auf Befragungen der Täter, der wenigen Überlebenden und polnischer Augenzeugen…“
(Research is limited by the almost total absence of meaningful sources. In contrast to the concentration camps hardly any documents have been found about the “Action Reinhardt” camps. Those were almost completely destroyed in the fall of 1943, when the camps were dismantled …This is why historiography is based for the most part on perpetrator statements and remaining Polish eyewitnesses.)
Under  we read that Globocnik wrote about the destruction of documents in a letter of January 5, 1944 to Himmler. As a source, Pohl refers to the Nuremberg trials (Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg 1949, Bd. 34, S. 71). I have not been able to confirm this since I have no access to German documents and there is nothing in Avalon I could find. But even if documents were destroyed, we have no idea what was lost or what anything refers to. To assume that it had to do with mass murder is like saying: “The information we need is contained in the documents we don’t have.” The whole case for mass murder as the intent for “Action Reinhard(t)” rests on hearsay. But, some Globocnik documents survived; more on that later.
Pohl then goes into some detail on Soviet trials, but concedes:
“Was ist diesen sowjetischen Akten nun zu entnehmen? Zunächst muss berücksichtigt werden, dass es sich nicht um rechtsstaatliche Verfahren handelte. In den Vernehmungen wurden die Beschuldigten oft bedroht, gelegentlich, besonders bei den Prozessen Ende der 1940er-, Anfang der 1950er-Jahre wohl auch misshandelt. Deshalb sind individuelle Beschuldigungen und Selbstbezichtigungen eher mit Vorsicht zu betrachten. Die Aussagen zur allgemeinen Lagergeschichte lassen sich jedoch teilweise verifizieren und erscheinen meist glaubwürdig. Deshalb ist es wichtig, die Materialien mit westlichen Untersuchungsergebnissen zu konfrontieren und daraus auf die Glaubwürdigkeit zu schließen.“
(What can be learned from the Soviet documents? First, we must take into account that these were not legal trials (rechtsstaatlich translates into constitutional). During the interrogations the accused were often threatened and sometimes, especially during trials toward the end of the 1940s, abused. As such, accusations and self incriminations must be treated with care. Statements about conditions in the camps can be partially verified and appear to be believable. It is therefore imperative that the material is compared to western investigation results.)
A mouthful, to be sure. Pohl admits that what was beaten out of the accused by the Soviets is for the most part useless; still, he wastes pages on it. As for reports on conditions in the camps, they “seem” to be believable. The last sentence is, however, what takes the cake. He writes that western investigation reports need to be consulted. What investigations? No investigation by a competent body of experts has ever been undertaken. He later mentions Andrzej Kola, who took some soil samples at Belzec. The problem with that is that whatever he claims to have found cannot be verified, since the camp has since been sanitized and the ground covered over. What was offered is bunk. Carlo Mattogno demonstrated this (http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/b/ ). Pohl later admits that what is claimed cannot be substantiated. He writes:
“Das größte Desiderat bleibt jedoch weiterhin die Rekonstruktion des Schicksals der Opfer. Mit der Entdeckung des Höfle-Telegramms und dessen Veröffentlichung im Jahr 2001 erscheint es möglich, wenigstens die Zahl der Opfer in den drei Lagern zu bestimmen.“
(The biggest ‘desideratum‘ remaining is to ascertain what happened to the victims. With the assistance of the Höfle telegram and its publication in 2001, it appears to be possible to at least determine the number of victims in the three camps.)
Heaven help! First he uses the term Desiderat, a word not commonly used in German. Webster’s defines this as “of desiderare; to desire; to entertain or express a wish to have or attain.” Golly gosh, why use this word when he could have used wünschenswert (“desirable”), or some such? Was it done to befuddle the issue? No doubt in my mind; what he writes is astonishing, to say the least. He admits that we don’t know what happened to the Jews, yet he turns them into “victims.” Then he follows this up by writing that finally in 2001 we became aware of some numbers, thus it is now apparently possible to know the number of “victims.” What was used before, and how is a telegram with some numbers on it evidence of mass murder?
But he is not done with his declaration of bankruptcy, he tells us:
“Lange Zeit spielten die Zeugenaussagen der sogenannten Bystander, also zumeist der Anwohner der Vernichtungslager, keine herausragende Rolle bei der Rekonstruktion der Vorgänge. Zwar haben polnische Justizbehörden vor allem unmittelbar nach dem Krieg und dann in den 1960er-Jahren auch Personen aus diesem Kreis befragt, darüber hinaus ist dies jedoch nicht systematisch betrieben worden. Das ist insofern bedauerlich, als gerade die Anwohner oft einen genauen Einblick in das Lagerleben hatten, manche polnischen Handwerker gingen gar in Vernichtungslagern ein und aus; einige der Trawniki-Männer hatten Beziehungen zu Einwohnern aus dem Dorf. Auch das Eisenbahnpersonal in den Dörfern bestand in der Mehrheit aus Einheimischen. Inzwischen kommt die Zeit für solche Befragungen an ihr Ende.“
(For a long time witness testimonies of the so-called bystanders, neighbors of the camps, were not considered when trying to reconstruct what happened. Although Polish judicial authorities did interrogate some of them after the war, and in the 1960s, but it was not done systematically. This is distressing, for those neighbors were able to observe life in the camps: some Polish tradesmen came and went; some of the foreign guards had relationships with people in the villages. The train personnel also consisted mostly of locals. But by now the time to consult them is coming to an end.)
Unbelievable, but exactly what we have been saying all along. These camps, Treblinka especially, were not hidden: the alleged killing site of Treblinka was on higher ground. And yes, locals came to sell their goods, workers entered and left the camps. At Treblinka, we are told that 880,000 Jews were killed and buried at first in huge mass graves, said graves to measure 50m x 25m by 10m deep (roughly 150′ x 75′ by 30′ deep). Digging those holes could not have been concealed, yet we have no reports, no pictures, nothing; to top it off, those huge pits have never been located. Then it was decided to exhume the bodies and burn them on pyres, with fires raging night and day. And again, not one report by the locals—no pictures, nothing. So yes, Pohl is right; there is no evidence of mass murder.
As for the alleged “murder weapon,” he writes that the exhaust of internal combustion engines was the killer. Again, no details, and here he is careful: diesel engines are mentioned, which are internal combustion engines, but they are unsuitable for mass murder.
What Pohl writes confirms the case made by revisionists. There is no evidence of mass murder in the “Aktion Reinhard(t)” camps. In fact, it was impossible to murder hundreds of thousands without anyone noticing, taking pictures, writing reports, etc. Thus we need to look for an alternative intent to understand what was meant by “Aktion Reinhard(t)”. The “t” spelling gives us our clue. Morsch et al. mention Fritz Reinhardt from the finance ministry, dismissing him of course—but why refer to him at all? When “The Holocaust” story emerged, the real Reinhardt did not fit in and was therefore dropped into a deep, black hole.
But we do have some indications that this “Aktion Reinhardt”, and I am convinced that this is the correct spelling, was an economic undertaking, originating with the finance ministry. Early publications are extremely helpful in determining how the story developed: what was written then and how it compares to what we are told now. One of those early publications provides details, the title Die Todesfabrik (The Death Factory) by the Czech Holocaust survivors Ota Kraus and Erich Kulka (Kongress-Verlag Berlin, 1958). The two arrived in Auschwitz on November 4, 1942 and were transferred to Birkenau two days later (p. 10). They were successful in organizing resistance groups, were well informed as to happenings inside the camp, and so informed the world. Again, the subject of another discussion, but in a sub-chapter of their book, titled “Aktion Reinhard” (pp. 123-126) they provide details of this action. There’s too much to discuss here, so I just copied (from pp. 124-25) portions of the testimony by Rudolf Höß during his 1947 Cracow trial:
“Welche Dimensionen diese Aktion hatte und was für ungeheure Vorteile nicht nur das Reich, sondern auch die nazistische Herrschaftsclique daraus zog, bewies am besten die Aussage des Kommandanten der Auschwitzer Lager, Rudolf Höß, während seines Prozesses:
„Unvorstellbare und nicht abzuschätzende Werte von Hunderten von Millionen sind erfaßt worden. Ungeheure Werte sind gestohlen worden von SS-Angehörigen und Polizisten, von Häftlingen, Zivilangestellten und Arbeitern, vom Bahnpersonal.Beim Entladen der angekommenen Judentransporte blieb das gesamte Gepäck auf der Rampe liegen, bis alle Juden nach den Vernichtungsstellen beziehungsweise ins Lager gebracht waren. Danach wurde durch ein besonderes Transportkommando das gesamte Gepäck in der ersten Zeit nach der Sortierstelle – Kanada I – gebracht, um dort sortiert beziehungsweise desinfiziert zu werden. Auch die Kleidung der in den Bunkern I und II bzw. Krematorien I bis IV Vergasten wurde nach der Vergasung nach der Sortierstelle gebracht.Schon 1942 war Kanada I nicht mehr in der Lage, die Sortierung laufend zu erledigen. Trotz immer wieder neu aufgestellter zusätzlicher Schuppen und Baracken, Tag- und Nachtarbeit der sortierenden Häftlinge und andauernder Verstärkung dieser Kommandos, türmte sich das noch unsortierte Gepäck, obwohl täglich mehrere Waggons, oft bis zu zwanzig, mit sortiertem Material verladen wurden. Berge von unsortiertem Gepäck türmten sich zwischen den Baracken. Die Arbeitskommandos konnten noch so verstärkt werden, während des Ablaufens der einzelnen Aktionen – die immer zirka vier bis sechs Wochen dauerten – war an ein Nachkommen nicht zu denken. Erst in längeren Pausen wurde annähernd aufgeräumt.Nach der Sortierung nach Abschluß größerer Aktionen wurden die Wertsachen und das Geld in Koffer gepackt und mit Lastwagen nach Berlin zum Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt gebracht, von da zur Reichsbank. Eine besondere Abteilung der Reichsbank befaßte sich nur mit diesen Sachen aus den Judenaktionen …Das Zahngold wurde im SS-Revier von den Zahnärzten zu Barren eingeschmolzen und monatlich dem Sanitätshauptamt zugeführt…”So sah die „Aktion Reinhard” aus, (beschrieben von einer besonders maßgebenden Person, dem Kommandanten der Auschwitzer Lager.”
Just roughly: “What dimensions this action had – and the tremendous benefits arrived from it – is best described by Commandant Rudolf Höß during his trial:
“Values in the hundreds of millions were obtained, enormous amounts have been stolen.
During the unloading of the trains, the luggage was left lying on the ramp, all Jews were taken to be executed or admitted to the camp. Thereafter, the entire luggage was sorted out and disinfected in Kanada I. The clothing of those gassed in Bunker I and II, as well as in crematoria I to IV was also taken there.
By 1942 Kanada was no longer able to do the sorting. Despite the addition of new sheds and barracks, the still unsorted luggage was piled high, although several rail cars each day – often up to twenty – were loaded and left with sorted material. Mountains of unsorted luggage piled up between the huts. The work details could be enlarged, however during the individual actions – which lasted approximately four to six weeks – this was impossible.
After sorting, following the completion of a major action, the valuables and money were packed into suitcases and brought to Berlin to the Economic and Administrative Main Office, and from there to the Reichsbank. A special department of the Reichsbank now looked after these things from the Jewish actions …
The dental gold was melted down in the SS infirmary and transported monthly to the main medical office … ”
Such was the “Operation Reinhard”, as described by a particularly influential person, the commander of the Auschwitz camp…”.
The authors (K/K) then go into details, as to how many pair of shoes, dresses, etc., etc., but not one word about the “extermination” camps Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, the supposed “Aktion Reinhardt” camps. As for clothing etc., K/K tell us that as soon as the arrivals disappeared into the “bath,” quotation marks in the original, all their belongings were taken to be sorted. Nothing sinister here: inmates were issued prisoner’s clothing; though, whatever valuables were found were confiscated, including clothing. It also appears that some inmates carried large amounts of luggage along. We read this in A Year in Treblinka, by Yankel Wiernick:
“Jews from foreign countries brought considerable luggage with them.”
This is confirmed in the verdict of the Treblinka trial of September 3, 1965 (this used to be available at the IDGR [Informations-Dienst Gegen Rechtsextremismus] site, unfortunately it disappeared, all I have is the copy [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informationsdienst_gegen_Rechtsextremismus ]):
“Da alle diese Personen auch noch über zum Teil recht umfangreiches Gepäck verfügten, blieb der Raum für die einzelne Person auf wenige Quadratzentimeter beschränkt.“(Since all of those persons carried considerable amounts of luggage, room for each person [in the rail cars] was at a premium). Based on this, a case for theft can perhaps be made, but not for mass murder.)
Now to what was uncovered at the IMT. The following is from “One Hundred and Ninety-Sixth Day Tuesday; 6 August 1946, Morning Session”:
“REINECKE: It is obvious from the document that Globocznik was acting in his capacity as SS and Police Leader, charged with a secret special task, the so-called “Aktion Reinhard.” He is acting solely as police executive. Any connection between this activity and the organization of the General SS or any of its members does not exist in any way…
HERR PELCKMANN: Would you look to the top of Page 3? I think that indicates quite clearly who was dealing with those matters, and on whose authority Globocznik was acting.
REINECKE: Page 3 of this document shows that the Aktion Reinhard was divided into four parts: (a) resettlement, (b) use of labor, (c) use of materials, (d) seizure of hidden values and real estate. It also shows that Globocznik was communicating with Oswald Pohl personally, as well as with Himmler, on this matter. Pohl was chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office,…
Okay, we read “Reinhard” with no “t”, but this could be a translation issue. But here we have what “Aktion Reinhardt” was all about: economic issues. First resettlement of those unable to work; then use of labor and material; last the seizure of valuables. Why would the Germans kill valuable laborers, desperately needed for the war effort? And no, not just women, children and old people were allegedly killed in the three camps. Yankel Wiernik writes in A Year in Treblinka: “The day I first saw men, women and children being led into the house of death I went nearly insane.”
Now to Globocnik, mentioned by Pohl above. This again is from the verdict of the German Treblinka trial referred to before. Under II. Die Endlösung im Generalgouvernement (The final solution in the general government), regarding actions in the three Reinhardt camps we read:
“Sie wurde in diesem Bereich – wahrscheinlich in Anlehnung an den Vornamen des damaligen Chefs des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes Reinhard Heydrich – unter der Tarnbezeichnung “Aktion Reinhard” oder auch “Einsatz Reinhard” durchgeführt.“
(The covert actions undertaken under the term “Action Reinhard” or “Effort Reinhard” were possibly named after the chief of the security office of that time, Reinhard Heydrich.)
Possibly? And then again not. True, the spelling used by the ‘judges’ was that of Reinhard, but as Messrs. Morsch and Perz point out, we have two different spellings. And as can be shown, economics were the issue: the ministry of finance initiated this action, hence “Reinhardt”.
Back to the verdict: first a letter from Viktor Brack from the chancellery (and we are to believe that Hitler was not involved) to Himmler, of June 23, 1942. In this letter, and I have the wording but too long to copy here, Brack informs Himmler that he has made some of his men available to Globocnik for the implementation of this special task (für die Durchführung seiner Sonderaufgabe). He then tells Himmler that he has now added personnel so as to not get stuck should transportation issues arise. Thus, transportation was a concern, understandably so since trains were needed for the war effort. And secrecy had to be maintained, for those deportations were not popular in Germany; quite the contrary.
We then have a second letter, dated October 19, 1943 – and we need to remember that Pohl claims all documents have been destroyed – in which Globocnik informs Himmler that all camps have been dismantled. In another letter of January 1, 1944 Globocnik informs Himmler:
“Die gesamte Aktion Reinhard zerfällt in 4 Gebiete:
A) die Aussiedlung selbst
B) die Verwertung der Arbeitskraft
C) die Sachverwertung
D) die Einbringung verborgener Werte und Immobilien“
(The whole of Action Reinhard consists of four subsections: A) resettlement, B) use of labor, C) use of materials, D) seizure of hidden values and real estate.)
All of these are economic issues, but of course we must read “mass murder” into this. From the Treblinka verdict again:
“Die bei der Aktion Reinhard angefallenen und in den drei Vernichtungslagern Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka sichergestellten Sachwerte, die dem SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt in Berlin zur Verfügung gestellt wurden, machen nach einem von Globocnik unterzeichneten, für dieses Amt in Berlin bestimmten Bericht über die verwaltungsmässige Abwicklung der Aktion Reinhard den Betrag von RM 178.745.960,59 aus, der sich wie folgt aufgliedert:…“
(The valuables recovered in the three Action Reinhard extermination [sic] camps Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, and made available to the administration in Berlin, are summarized in a letter signed by Globocnik and amount to RM 178.745.960,59.)
178 million plus, not bad. But we must remember that the National Socialists considered them to be ill gotten gains, illegally amassed during the existence of the Weimar Republic. No doubt innocents were affected, but, following the renewed declaration of war by World Jewry, this time from Moscow and published in November 1941 by the “Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee”, Hitler had no choice but to consider all of them a potential threat to national security. (H. Härtle, Freispruch für Deutschland, Verlag K.W. Schütz, Göttingen, 1956, pp. 249-255)
Where are they then if not murdered? This is asked repeatedly; the answer: make a solid case for mass murder and the question becomes redundant. There have been some half-hearted “investigations” conducted in Belzec and Sobibor, but what has been determined is far from convincing and impossible to confirm; the Belzec grounds have been covered. As for Treblinka, where 880,000 Jews were “murdered” according to Yad Vashem, no investigation worth the term has ever been undertaken. The Soviets during their ‘investigation’ determined that the murder weapon was a motor used to pump the air out of the building, thus the Jews mass suffocated (Mattogno, Graf, Treblinka, Extermination Camp or Transit Camp? http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/t/4.html ). According to Aradt, at first 700,000 Jews were murdered and buried in huge mass graves (http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/t/5.html , chapter 10) measuring 50m x 25m by 10m deep (roughly 150′ x 75′ by 30′ deep; http://www.zchor.org/treblink/wiernik.htm#chapter3 ) before being exhumed and burned. Those huge mass graves have yet to be located. An English archeologist, Carolyn Sturdy Colls, offered to investigate. She writes:
“Forensic archeology is the collection of evidence for use in a legal case. This can be anything from investigating a single murder to genocide or war crimes.
It’s hard to believe that there has been no systematic search for the six million victims who perished in the Holocaust.
800,000 people were murdered here at Treblinka and their bodies were never found. It’s time we started looking.
I’m a scientist and while I obviously feel the same emotions as everyone else when I read about the atrocities committed during the Holocaust, I need to be able to do my job objectively. So I need to shut out these emotions sometimes, and let the evidence speak for itself.
There are some very vocal Holocaust deniers who use spurious archeology to claim that the Holocaust never happened. That’s why it’s so important that we use the most up-to-date scientific techniques. This can be done, and it should be done.”
It now appears that Sturdy Colls is taking a closer look
But, and this is from the article linked to above:
“As Jewish religious law forbids disturbing burial sites, she and her team from the University of Birmingham have used ‘ground-penetrating radar’…”
So, again no investigation which would include experts in crime investigation and diggings, but just a sort of probing to then cover it all up again. And Jewish laws only selectively forbid digging, that is, it is allowed when they are reasonably sure to find something:
Nothing was found here either, but that is not the issue, digging is. Why then no proper investigation, what are the promoters of the story afraid of? Why not invite experts to come and investigate if all is “obvious”? We also mustn’t forget that this is almost 70 years later, why no investigation earlier? And from what I have seen so far of what is happening at Treblinka now can not be called an investigation, more an effort to satisfy the gullible and also to keep “The Holocaust” front and center.
Therefore, unless and until a proper investigation is undertaken, by experts in the field of criminal investigations – forensic experts – using all the tools at their disposal, including digging, “Aktion Reinhardt” must be considered to have been an economic undertaking.