By Wilfried Heink
A while back I was made aware of a book by Rolf Vogel: “Ein Stempel hat gefehlt” (One rubber stamp was missing). The book, published in 1977, highlights the efforts made by various German officials to help Jews escape from what has become known as “Nazi Germany”. Vogel, the son of a German Father and a Jewish Mother, starts his narrative by writing that just a few days following his Fathers death, sometime at the beginning of September 1939 (no date given), two Gestapo (secret state police) officers knocked at the door, producing a search warrant. His Father had, however, close connections to Hjalmar Schacht, the former president of the state Bank and had given the senior Vogel a letter, stating that if there are threats by the Gestapo to contact him, telephone number provided. Schacht promised that he would do all in his power to help him. Vogel junior showed this letter to the officers, they excused themselves, saying that all must be a mistake, and left.
The book provides an almost complete timeline, starting with the Haavara (Transfer) Agreement and closing with the minutes of the Wannsee conference. More than half of the book is filled with copies of documents- and where they can be found. But before Vogel gets into the documents he provides some background.
We learn that antisemitism goes back a long way, because Jews were able to maintain their identity – they became targets of hatred, were envied, singled out and blamed for all the wrongs (Sündenböcke). Christianity was at fault, Vogel provides some examples. Thus, he argues, Hitler came by his antisemitism honestly, having been raised in a climate of antisemitism and the killing of 6 million of Jews somewhat of a logical extension of said antisemitism. In the view of Herr Vogel, the governments/population of the host countries were responsible, without exception, Jews always innocent victims. Then we learn that Hitler was popular because he was able to do away with unemployment. At the close of 1933, slightly more than 6 million Germans were unemployed, dropping to a little over 300,000 at the end of January 1939. And Vogel stresses that this was not because of re-armament, he quotes from the book by H. Schacht, published in 1968, “1933 – Wie eine Demokratie stirbt” (How a democracy dies):
“Als 1937 die Vollbeschäftigung erreicht wurde, nahm die Reichsbank dies zum Anlaß, ihre Finanzhilfe einzustellen. Vom 1. April 1938 ab hat die Reichsbank keinen Pfennig mehr für die Arbeitsbeschaffung hergegeben, Daß die Beseitigung der Arbeitslosigkeit der Aufrüstung zu danken gewesen sei, ist ein Märchen, leider ein bösartiges“. 
What this says is that when in 1937 full employment had been achieved, the bank did no longer financially support work creation measures. And now the important part, the last sentence: “That full employment had been reached was not because of re-armament, that is a fable, a vicious one”. We must remember that Schacht was in charge of finances up to 8 January 1939, when he was dismissed, and knew what he was talking about. Schacht joined the opposition after his dismissal – some say before that – and that this was the real reason for his loss of influence. At the IMT he acknowledged his acquittal with a smirk, the exoneration probably pay-back for services rendered by him.
Vogel then tells us that between June 27. and July 5. 1933, all Germanys political parties had failed miserably to stop Hitler, not only that, they supported him by voluntarily dissolving themselves. The Social Democrats (SPD) on 10 July 1933 issued a statement, the following only as an example:
“Den Inhabern von Mandaten werde empfohlen, ihre Tätigkeit in einem Sinne auszüben, der weder einen Zweifel an ihrer nationalen Gesinnung noch an dem guten Willen zulassen, die politische Neubildung Deutschlands nach den Plänen der nationalen Revolution zu unterstützen”. 
Translation: “It is suggested that all political representatives perform their duties in a manner that leaves no doubt as to their national opinions, nor on their good will to allow the re-construction of Germany and to support the aims of the national revolution”. The Centrist party published much the same, as did the unions. Church leaders also pledged loyalty to the Third Reich and the Führer. Today’s “historians” talk of a Machtergreifung by Hitler, a power grab, and even though National Socialists also used that term, it was anything but. It was indeed a revolution, but power had been transferred to Hitler legally, and most important, Hitler had the backing of at least the ordinary Germans right to the end.
Vogel admits that Hitler came into power legally, he also has to admit to his popularity but adds – because all of this will not really fit into the story – that German officials only pretended to be loyal. Whist this might have been so in some/several cases – many communist intellectuals for instance just laid low and National Socialism a workers movement – Hitlers support was real. And yes, there was opposition, some of it quite well organized and as the war dragged on that opposition became stronger, but the lower classes to a great extend continued to support Hitler.
Hitler never made a secret of that fact that he wanted to get rid of the Jews, blamed them for much that was wrong, especially in the Weimar Republik, and not without justice. Only 0.7% of the total German population in the Weimar Republik were Jews and yet 16.25% of all lawyers and judges were Jews, medical doctors 10.88% and they all but controlled the entertainment industry, as well as the press, thus Hitler spoke of a Jewish Überfremdung, an overrepresentation by a foreign people. In Berlin, of 6203 medical doctors, 2614 were Jews, that is 42% and of 3890 lawyers, 1879 Jewish – 48%. Dr. Willy Glasebock writes in the NZ (Nürnberger Zeitung) Nr.5 of 2 April 1966, that all restrictions for Jews that had existed before were dropped in the Weimar Republik. Jews pushed to the fore not only in economics but also in government, literature, the press and were able to fill important positions in entertainment. In politics they associated themselves mostly with the left, that the communist Jew Kurt Eisner became minister president of Bavaria was registered in the rest of Germany with indignation. Glasebock lists many more examples, including some of the dubious financial dealings by Eastern-European Jewish shysters and concludes that it is a small wonder that antisemitism grew in the Weimar Republik and that no Hitler was needed for this. Prof. Ernst Nolte writes extensively about the involvement of Jews in communism in Germany – the attempt to establish a “Soviet Germany”. Germans were also well aware of the butchering by the Jewish-Bolsheviks that had happened/was happening in Russia, and therefore not interested in the establishment of a Soviet-Germany. Herr Vogel neglects to take all of this into consideration. Thus religion or history had little to do with the antisemitism of National Socialists, it was based on recent experiences.
Then we learn about the boycott of Jewish shops on 1 April 1933 (a Sabbath), initiated by Julius Streicher, but not a word about the World Jewry boycott of 23 March, preceding that of April. It is true that measures were undertaken to limit the influence Jews had in Germany – some Jews placed in protective custody, some killed – but aside from a few incidents, no organized attempt to murder Jews. Vogel writes that following Hitler’s ascent to power in January of 1933, the first wave of emigration of Jews happened. Of the 550,000 Jews living in Germany at that time, only 500,000 remained in June of that year, some died, some were killed but the majority emigrated. Emigration slowed in 1934 – one has to wonder why since Vogel talks of anti-Jewish terror right after Hitler was installed as Chancellor – but the issuing of the Nürnberg Laws in 1935 triggered a second wave of emigration. Then a third wave following the Kristallnacht, night of broken glass in November 1938. Most Jews went to Palestine and the USA, but as the terror (Vogel’s term) increased, Jews also moved to Argentine, Brazil, Uruguay, Columbia, Chile, South Africa and Australia, as well as many other countries. By 1937, only 16% moved to Palestine, the Brits had placed restrictions on Jewish emigration, thus most Jews moved to other countries, 38% of them to the USA.
The Haavara Agreement (documents 1-18)
Hitler was in favor of Jewish emigration in the years before the war, that according to Herr Vogel, but at first he only wanted to have them removed from the German society. Trying to get rid of the Jews created many problems, no other country was willing to take large numbers of Jews. The boycott, declared by world Jewry on 23 March 1933, was also starting to hurt, prompting Vice-Chancellor von Papen to address, on 27 March 1933, a letter to the German-American trade commission (Handelskammer), writing that hundreds of thousands of Jews were living as before, Jewish publishing houses doing business as usual (Jewish newspapers still published in 1937). In June of that year, Foreign Minister von Neurath visited London and told von Hindenburg upon his return that all conversation with British officials had centred around the treatment of Jews in Germany, even the King had voiced his concern.
Germany was in a predicament, it wanted to get rid of the Jews because of their un-German influence but Germany was also short of cash, as was most of the world at that time, and thus unable to allow Jews to take what money they had with them. Thus the Haavara Agreement was worked out, to at least make it possible for Jews to emigrate to Palestine, something the Zionists insisted upon, Weizmann sabotaging any other plan.
The plan was to work roughly like this, Ingrid Weckert provides more details : Jews who were about to emigrate to Palestine paid their money into a bank accounts in Germany, set up especially for this occasion (Sonderkontos). To make settlement of the new arrivals in Palestine possible, the Jews needed all sorts of goods: farm machinery, industrial equipment, household goods, etc., etc. German companies supplied those goods but instead of getting paid by the recipients in Palestine, the money owing was paid to the German companies out of the special account. In May 1933 the Palestinian (Jewish) citrus fruits production company, Hanotea Ltd, was able to reach an agreement with the German economics ministry (Reichswirtschaftsministerium) and out of this agreement the Haavara grew which existed for eight years, till 1941. This agreement was a success, about 55,000 Jews emigrated to Palestine, Polish Jews included. Among them were doctors, lawyers, merchants, etc., as well as workers and students. But also groups of Zionists, whose aim it was to create a Jewish homeland.
And because of this Zionists aim, problems arose. The Jewish Agency in Palestine controlled Haavara and thus all imports into Palestine. The Arabs, as well as the German settlers, were unable to purchase equipment delivered by German firms, the Zionists in fact boycotting German agricultural products. And because of the preferential treatment by Germans of the Jews, they run the risk of upsetting their Arab allies.
The German Consul in Jerusalem, Döhle, therefore, on 22 March 1937, saw the need to send a letter to Berlin asking them to address the issues listed in his letter. In his opinion, and I can only skip through the 14 page letter, three possibilities existed for solving the issues:
Total Jewish solution, i.e., implementing the Balfour plan and turn Palestine into a Jewish homeland, to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English. This would mean that Arabs and Germans would no longer be able to live a normal life (Palestine today proves his point). This would please the Jews but upset the Arabs. In this case, Jewish emigration, from Germany to Palestine, could continue
Total Arab solution, create a Palestinian state under Arab government based on an agreement with England as has been done in Iraq, or in Syria between the French and the Syrians. No more special rights (Sonderrechte) for Jews, the Zionist influence would diminish, thus making a co-existence between Arabs and Jews possible. Emigration of German Jews to Palestine would come to a halt.
A compromise, curb Jewish emigration, consider Arab concerns and if need be, install a neutral body to pass laws as needed.
Döhle continues by pointing out that by continuing to help the Jews in Palestine to establish industries, etc., utilising the experiences gained in Germany, they would eventually be a threat to German imports since those Jews are naturally hostile to Germany. He also mentions that the majority of Jews arriving in Palestine are Polish Jews and that German Jews are a negligible minority (more of the missing Polish Jews found. Wilf). He writes however that because of the purchase of German products, by Zionists in Palestine, the boycott of German products on the world market is somewhat offset. As mentioned, the letter is too long to do it justice here, and Döhle admits at the end of it that a solution will not be easy to find.
We then have a study by the Foreign Office (AA) Ambassador von Bülow-Schwante , dated 27 April 1937, the topic: “Policy needed regarding the Jewish state in Palestine”. He writes that: “Jewish demands concerning the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine are more common place and openly debated. A publication in the Jüdischen Rundschau, Nr. 29 and 30 (included) only concerns itself with the borders of this future state. But, as has been made clear all along by officials in Department D, the breaking up of world Jewry must be our aim, not the establishment of a Jewish state. This is why emigration to Palestine should not be encouraged unconditionally – emigration to other countries throughout the world instead.”
We then have a telegram of 1 June 1937 from Foreign Minister von Neurath to the German embassies in London, Jerusalem and Baghdad.  In it v. Neurath points out that a Jewish state in Palestine will never be able to absorb all of the Jews, but that it would instead create a power base for international Jewry, something like the Vatican for Catholicism and Moscow for the Comintern (how true to this day. Wilf).
Now to the minutes of a meeting of various official on September 21 – 22,1937, regarding the Haavara Agreement. Consul Döhle was asked to reiterate what changes to the Haavara Agreement are necessary. Döhle stood by what he wrote in his letter of 22 March 1937 (see above) and insisted that efforts be made to break the monopoly of the Jewish Agency, existing because of that Agreement. But privy councillor Daniel pointed out that this would be impossible, the Haavara Agreement must stay in place to not upset the Jews (…mit Rücksicht auf die verschiedenen Stimmungen der jüdischen Kreise). Agreement was reached to give the Tempelbank (the German settlers called themselves Templerkolonien) more influence so as to have a say in who receives what from Germany. It was then pointed out – at a meeting of the interior ministry officials – that the Führer had decided to advance Jewish emigration, but not necessarily to Palestine exclusively. It was further decided to put the Tempelbank in charge of the orange export to Germany, so Haavara officials, who threaten boycott anytime things don’t go their way, no longer control that part if the Agreement.
Vogel provides a few more documents which demonstrate the differences of opinion, re. this Agreement, between foreign office officials, who would like to maintain it, and party officials who fear that a Jewish state will not be to Germanys benefit.
Mussolini’s and Roosevelt’s Proposals 1934, 1938/39 (documents 19-23)
“Jews need to have a real state, not this silly little national home offered by the British”(Mussolini to Nahum Goldmann on 13 November 1934)
Goldmann, president of the Jewish World Congress, recounts in his memoirs a meeting between him and Mussolini at the Roman Palazzo Venetia, those memoirs published in 1970 by Kiepenheuer and Witsch, Cologne. An excerpt:
Goldmann: “I talked about the German Jewish question…I represent Jews from all over the world and it is impossible for me to dismiss the principle of equality to improve the fate of German Jews. This principle of equality is permanent, important for future generations as it is for this one. We are an ancient, historical people”, I told the Duce, “and our policy must not jeopardize the future of our people, by improving the lot of just some of the Jewish generations”.
Mussolini listened attentively. ‘When Dr. Sacerdoti (chief Rabbi of Rom) gave me this message on your behalf, I was upset, but now I understand, you are correct. You are a wise man and represent a great and immortal (unvergängliches) people. Don’t be afraid of Herr Hitler (even though he spoke in French he said ‘Herr’). I know Herr Hitler (a few weeks prior he had met Hitler in Venice for the first time). He is a Dummkopf (dunce), a vaurien (hooligan), a fanatical simpleton, a babbler; it is painful to listen to him. You are much more powerful than Herr Hitler, no trace will remain of Herr Hitler, but Jews will still be a great people. You and ‘we’ he shouted, and I had no idea if by ‘we’ he was referring to Italy or fascism, ‘are great historical powers. Herr Hitler is a joke to last for a few years. Don’t be afraid of him and tell this to your people’.
‘But Hitler has a navy, an army and an organized people of 70 million. We are scattered, we have no navy, no army, we are powerless’.
‘This is true’, Mussolini answered, ‘but I am telling you that you are mightier than Hitler. Most important, Jews must not be afraid of him. We will all witness his demise. But you have to create a Jewish state. I am a Zionist. You must have a real state, not this silly little national home offered by the British. I will help you to create this Jewish state, the important issue is that Jews trust their future and not be afraid of this simpleton (Dummkopf) in Berlin’”.
Next we have a memo concerning a letter of 7 December 1938 from Roosevelt to Mussolini, concerning the settlement of Jews. Italian foreign minister Count Ciano handed a copy to von Mackensen, the German ambassador in Rom.
Roosevelt wrote that even though the Interstate Committee is meeting in London at this time, no agreement has been reached in regards to refugees. The US is of the opinion that this problem can only be solved by international co-operation.
In search for a suitable settlement area, the President has been persuaded that the Ethiopian Plateau should be considered. Should the Italian head of state be able to have those, who are affected by this, agree to the plan, the President would put his backing behind it.
Important is of course how the Germans would react to this, but we know that Dr. Schacht had been in London to establish contact with the Interstate Committee and that he has made specific proposals as to how to make emigration possible over the next years. He also addressed the financial aspect (details about the financial arrangements).
The President harbours the well founded hope that the Italian head of state will take this into consideration to solve this international problem.
Mussolini answered on 11 January 1939 and told the President that it would be impossible to even think about a settlement of Jews in Ethiopia. The attitude of Jews in Italy is not conductive to the idea of having a mass of Jewish emigrants living on Italian territory, that aside from other considerations. It is furthermore not only a question of Jews in Italy, this Jewish problem exists in almost all European countries and must therefore be considered to be an European issue.
In Mussolini’s opinion only countries with small populations and unpopulated territories could take in large number of Jewish emigrants…He is in favor of establishing a Jewish state somewhere, but the Palestinian experiment has been a failure.
Count Ciano calls all of this something not worth considering.
The French Madagascar Offer 1937/38 (documents 24-38)
First we have a press release by the DNB (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro), the official voice of the Third Reich, of 19 January 1937  In it we read that the French government, the colonial minister in particular, has been in contact with various French Jewish organizations in regards to allowing Jewish settlements in French colonies. Some studies have been undertaken and the governor of Madagascar has agreed to support efforts for Jewish settlements, provided that those efforts are supported by solid organizations with the necessary financial backing. Aside from Madagascar, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides or French Guinea could be considered.
The Jewish New York daily “Tog” of 24 January 1937 dismissed all efforts, claiming that the climate in the mentioned territories is not suitable 
Nevertheless, efforts continued and the Polish government became involved. The “Frankfurter Zeitung” of 13 May 1937 reports that the Polish government is working on a plan to settle Polish Jews in Madagascar, both governments, French and Polish, are looking at that possibility. A Paris daily (Pariser Tageszeitung), of 16 December 1937, reported that it is planned to send 25,000 – 30,000 Jewish families to Madagascar, financing made available by Jews in America, England and France. A Polish commission was send to Madagascar, consisting of: Chair: Major Mieczyslaw Lepecki(spelled Lipetzki in an other document), for years personal adjutant of Marshal Pilsudski; Leon Alter, director of the Jewish emigration committee; Samuel Dyck of Palestine(spelled Dick in an other document), a specialist in matters concerning Jewish settlement. The commission stayed 4 month in Madagascar, submitted a report to the Polish government and also visited the French colonial minister Marius Moutet. They concluded that the coastal regions are too hot and humid but that interior territories are well suited. And according to a Vienna daily, “Neuen Welt” of 25 January 1938, following Poland’s lead, Rumanian officials are also concerned about the over representation of Jews (Verjudung) in that country, both countries are looking at Madagascar as the new “Promised Land” for Jews. But, voices in France are heard, warning about the influx of Jews to Madagascar. Jacques Buissot writes in the daily “L’Époque” that if 50,000 Jewish families are settled there, as suggested by the US, Madagascar will loose its French identity, it will become a new “Promised Land” and France can lower its flag. In an article in the Vienna daily, “Reichspost” of 10 April 1938, we read that the French Professor Cambillard writes in “Oeuvre” that French culture in Madagascar will be destroyed by a massive influx of Jews, leaving the author of the “Reichspost” article to ask if it is not of equal importance to preserve Christian culture in Europe by telling the Jews to leave.
Those efforts too came to nought, the French Madagascar plan dropped.
The Interstate Committee 1938/39 (Evian Conference), documents 39-88
At the initiative of the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a conference was convened from July 6. – 15.1938 in the Swiss resort Evian-les-Bains with representatives of 32 nations attending. Vogel writes that this conference had failure written all over it right from the start. The representatives used it as a sort of wailing wall to bemoan the fate of European Jewry – being careful at the same time not to commit to anything, and the many documents provided bears this out. Mr. George Rublee, an American, was appointed chairman. On 8 June 1938, Ernst von Weizsäcker, German foreign office official, send a communiqué to the German Embassies in London, Paris, Rom, Washington and Warsaw, as well as others, stressing that the Jewish question has to be considered to be a internal German problem. He continued by stating that the English Envoy in Germany had contacted him, asking if Germany would participate but mentioned up front that no country is willing to take the Jews, especially if they are without adequate funds. Weizsäcker told him that easing restrictions re. transfer of Jewish capital – amassed following WWI – is out of the question. On 2 August 1938, the British Envoy again contacted v. Weizsäcker, asking him how this issue could be resolved and if Mr. Rublee would be invited to Berlin. Weizsäcker told him that the American Envoy, Mr. Wilson, had contacted him as well and that he had told him also that he considers committees of this kind to be of no use. He had been following the progress of the MacDonald committee, which eventually died due to lack of progress. “What had become clear is that many countries are able to produce Jews, but not one of them is willing to take any in. And now an attempt is made to contact Germany and that because we are unable to allow them to take their capital with them, we are to blame for the failure”.
Finally Göring entered the discussion to request that the emigration of Jews be continued, even if a trust-organisation has to be involved. The Austrian minister for economics, Fischböck, had approached Göring with a plan to tie the emigration of Jews to German exports, allowing Jews to transfer some of their money abroad if export of German goods is increased (details are provided. Wilf). The foreign minister (v. Ribbentrop) agreed to this plan and efforts were made to have Mr. Rublee come to Berlin for an informal meeting with German officials. But Göring insisted that the solution must be a business like solution and that all diplomatic and political intrigues have to be avoided. He further stated that finances can not be directly made available, that the finances needed must be made available through the increased exports of German goods.
The Schacht Plan
The result of all of this was what became to be known as the Schacht Plan. Vogel starts this out with a talk he had with Schacht on 16 January 1970, just before the latters death. He then goes into detail as to how this plan came about. It starts with a telegram of 12 December 1938 re. Schacht’s London visit of December 1938. Schumburg of the AA (foreign office) send this telegram to his home office in Berlin. He states that Schacht had been invited by the governor of the Bank of England (Norman) to come to London for a private meeting. The Führer knows about this and is in agreement, Schacht will report to the AA upon his return. From a telegram of 16 December 1938, by Herbert von Dirksen in London to the AA in Berlin re. details about the Schacht plan: Schacht stayed in London for three days as guest of Mr. Montague Norman. Concerning the emigration of Jews he met with Lord Winterton, chairman of the Evian conference, Mr. Rublee, chairman if the Interstate Committee and with the British economics advisor Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. Schacht detailed his plan of having 150,000 Jews emigrate from Germany over the next years, the financing of 1.5 Billion Marks to be provided by a consortium of foreign financiers and paid back through increased export of German goods. The aforementioned Gentlemen agreed to this plan. Schacht also contacted trade minister Stanley, as well as others, to talk about increased trade between the two nations, this was received with enthusiasm. The Führer is also in agreement and Helmut Wohlthat was appointed to assist. Mr. Wohltat had received a request from Lord Bearstedt, chairman of the Royal-Dutch-shell group, to forward an assessment re. the emigration of Jews from Germany. The plan is to appoint a trustee to administer Jewish assets in Germany and monitor the increased exports of goods for payment of interest, etc. Mr. Wohlthat also received the backing of the Hudson-Bay-Company and will report all progress to Göring and Schacht
But voices of concern were also raised. The AA official Hinrichs, in a letter to v. Weizsäcker of 7 January 1939, stated his opposition by writing that in his opinion, Germany has no obligation, be it moral or legal, to allow Jews to transfer their assets abroad, something that is prohibited even for German citizens. According to National Socialist doctrine Jews have – because most of them entered Germany without any capital – made their capital gains by dubious means and would thus take away what rightly belongs to Germany.  Nevertheless, Germany was willing to proceed with this plan. We should note here that Vogel, on p.57, writes that Jews who had emigrated to the US, most of them without funds (völlig mittellos), did very well after a very short time. Shades of Weimar Republik?
And now to the conversation between Vogel and Schacht, the documents caption: “The idea was, to get rid of the Jews in a peaceful manner”.
Schacht tells Vogel that he visited Hitler following the Kristallnacht and told him ‘This is not the way to deal with the Jews, this has to be addressed in an orderly manner’. He then lays out his plan to Hitler, stating up front that it would be impossible to hand to the Jews their capital, because most of it is tied up in real estate and the like and that Germany could also not afford it. Thus, he needed to find this money somewhere else. He tells Hitler what he intends to do, that plan discussed above. Vogel then asked him if Hitler was reluctant to agree to his plan. Schacht answered that the opposite was the case, the Führer seemed relieved. He then talks to Vogel about his meeting with Lord Bearstedt (Samuel), who told him that he very much liked this plan but needs to discuss it with Chaim Weizmann, the Jewish chief here in London. Two days later Bearstedt returned to tell him that Weizmann is absolutely against this plan. Schacht asked him if Weizmann told him what the reason for his refusal is, Bearstedt answered that he doesn’t know, meaning that he is not allowed to tell. Vogel than asks Schacht what he thinks is behind the refusal, Schacht tells him that he can only speculate but he believes it could be that Weizmann told himself: “It is my aim to establish Zion, to establish a Jewish state, and I can only achieve this when I allow great sacrifices to happen, so as to give it all a boost”. Schacht believed that Weizmann had this idea to create sacrifices (Opfer schaffen), he can offer no other explanation. To raise the money for this project would have been childs-play, Schact continued, Jews would have recovered their capital over time. He then tells Vogel that he of course informed German officials about the Weizmann refusal, and because of this negotiations were discontinued. But, so Schacht, following his dismissal Göring took charge and appointed Helmut Wohlthat to see if an agreement could be reached nevertheless. 
Rublee-Wohlthat Discussions (documents 76-81)
Mr. Rublee complains that neither in England nor American much interests was shown in his mission (one has to wonder if that was because of the Weizmann refusal). The problem always: Who will take the Jews? Germans were of course interested, the German ambassador in London, Theodor Kordt, making some efforts to help. Rublee had a few meetings with Schacht but when Schacht broke off negotiations in January 1939, Rublee claims to not know why (Schacht was dismissed on 8 January 1939), Göring became involved and things progressed again. Wohlthat entered the talks and a plan was worked out to have 400,000 Jews leave Germany over the next 3-5 years. This plan was favorable received in London and new York, but then Rublee had to quit his mission and return to New York, he claims that this had been decided upon earlier (In Dokument Nr.82, pp.255-259, we learn that Rublee decided to quit because of age, he was 72, and that his New York law firm required his presence). Was Mr. Weizmann responsible? We will never know. Germans lived up to the commitments until the war ended it all. Vogel writes, p.57, that in 1943, 97,374 German Jews emigrated to the US.
We then have the minutes/memo of a conversation between Vogel and Wohlthat in 1974. Wohlthat told Vogel that following the dismissal of Schacht they had to start from scratch. Financing would not have been a problem, but no government was prepared to take in large numbers of Jews. Vogel asked if German officials, including the Gestapo (secret state police), were a hindrance, Wohlthat denied this and mentioned that on the contrary, all were helpful and that the agreement reached between him and Rublee had been discussed by Gestapo officials.
In Dokument Nr.78 details about the agreement are provided, too long to copy all of it here, so just some highlights:
Heading: Interstate Committee, chair: Mr. Rublee, 1, Central Building, Westminster, London S.W; 1 Februar 1939. “It has been established that Germany is willing to make it easier for Jews to emigrate. A program has been worked out, and if other countries are willing to take in Jews on a continued basis, Germany will support this program…”. Under I, Jews are categorized, i.e., who is affected by this program. II talks about the Jews that are to remain in Germany, the old and those unable to emigrate for other reasons. Germany assures that these Jews will be able to live out their lives in Germany, unless unforeseen circumstances make this impossible. III is about financing. A trust fund is to be set up, with Germany contributing 25% of the total. Funds from account can be used to purchase goods and equipment needed for settlement programs. No taxes are to be collected from those Jews willing to emigrate based on this program.
Things did not proceed as quickly as anticipated, German officials however were not to blame for the delays. We read in the minutes of a meeting on 19 April 1939 between Wohlthat and German officials concerned with Jewish emigration that minister Dr. Schwandt stated that the sum needed to proceed with this program is about 850-900 million Marks and that he is optimistic that as much as 1.5 billions can be found. However, the other side needs to show that they also have made progress re. the financing, no figures have so far been submitted. The issue as to what countries are willing to take in Jews has also not been settled, England is dragging its heels but has promised to increase their efforts.
More discussions about the trust funds and countries willing- or unwilling, to take Jews follow, much of it repetitious.
This shows clearly that Germany was willing to co-operate in any way possible to have Jews leave in an orderly fashion. The Interstate Committee in one of its communiqués stated that it refrains from voicing any critique concerning internal German policies in regards to matters of religion or race in Germany. This is confirmed in another document: “Not one of the participating countries denies the unassailable right of the German government, to take measures in regards to certain citizens, when those measures are within its rights as a sovereign nation”. Nothing about murder so far, but Herr Vogel nevertheless now performs a leap of faith when he captions the next chapter:
“Get rid of the Jews” – official measures towards the Endlösung: Murder (documents 89-113)
(“Die Juden wegschaffen” – Amtliche Wege in die Endlösung: Mord)
It all starts with a document , worthy of note: “Stenographic Report of the Meeting on “The Jewish Question” under the chairmanship of Field Marshall Göring”. I copied the following from Avalon, the translation adequate, although parts are missing/misquoted. The meeting took place on 12 November 1938. This document was submitted at the IMT as PS-1816.
Göring starts out by stating that he had received a letter from vice chancellor Bormann, writing on behalf of the Führer, advising him to co-ordinate efforts concerning the Jewish question and to settle it in one way or another. The Führer followed this up by a phone call to Göring the next day, asking him to now take the decisive steps (the Avalon translation distorts this somewhat). The timing of this meeting is of interest: In the night of November 9. to 10. Kristallnacht (night of broken glass) happened, the riots a result of instigations by German officials, we are told to believe, with Goebbels the instigator. Vogel also peddles the Goebbels nonsense , providing no evidence. Fact is, Goebbels had no authority outside of Berlin, he was Gauleiter (governor) of Berlin and his authority ended at the city limits. I. Weckert provides details in her: “Feuerzeichen”. Göring continues, and I’ll get to that, by pointing out that the damage done did not hurt the Jews. Thus, if German official were responsible for the riots, they would have known that inciting masses would lead to unforeseen results. And if it was done with their blessings, they would have accepted the results, for to make an omelette, one needs to crack eggs. By condemning the actions, Göring proves that whatever happened on that night was because of the actions by outsiders, as Weckert makes clear, the National Socialist leadership having nothing to do with it.
Back to the meeting and Görings deliberations, I’ll just copy from the Avalon document, despite some of the shortcomings regarding translation (The strange wording in the original. Wilf):
“We have had this affair in Paris now (He is referring to the von Rath murder by H. Grynszpan. Wilf), more demonstrations followed and this time something decisive must be done!
Because, gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don’t harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the German economy.
If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which the Jew does not even have; and furthermore goods of the consumer goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future, demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be directed, so as not to hurt us.
Because it’s insane to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which I need desperately, whole bales of clothing and what-not, are being burned; and I miss them everywhere.
I may as well burn the raw materials before they arrive. The people of course, do not understand that; therefore we must make laws which will show the people once and for all, that something is being done.
I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all this, but the German insurance companies.
I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the insurance companies are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the competent Government agencies, so that everything shall be processed through the right channels and the insurance companies will not be the ones who suffer.
It may be, though, that these insurance companies may have insurance in foreign countries. If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. Hilgard of the insurance company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss this, under any circumstances.
I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim of today’s meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again, but to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to submit them to me, as far as it is necessary…”.
This makes it abundantly clear that first, the Third Reich brass had nothing to do with Kristallnacht and two, because of what had happened, Jews needed to be removed from the limelight for their own protection. Göring then talks about how the Jews were to be sidelined from German economics:
“The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from German economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated. The compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in Berlin. That way, we would never finish.
On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so that the lower echelons, Statthalter, and Gauleiter will not do things unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately…”.
He then outlines how this will be done and warns that if any official takes advantage:
“I shall not hesitate to act ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played (he refers to enrichment. Wilf). If the individual involved is prominent, I shall see the Fuehrer within two hours and report to him…”
The next document is a letter, dated 15 November 1938, from Reinhard Heydrich to the AA, in which Heydrich informs them that he will set up a central agency to advance Jewish emigration, this as a result of a direction by Göring. Jews in need of assistance will also be considered by this agency. The document following tells us that Heydrich will be in charge of this agency and that emigration must proceed post haste. Then we are told that, because there is no guarantee that the Rublee-Wohltat plan will succeed, Jews themselves will be involved, to ensure emigration proceeds as planned. The matter is urgent, Kristallnacht is mentioned again. Jews would be able to help, because of their international connections. That this is so has been proven in Vienna where since the central agency has been established in August 1938, 100,000 were able to leave with the help of Jews abroad. We then have the details of the plan envisioned by the agency and how Jews were to be involved. More documents follow outlining details re. financing, etc., all discussed above.
German Madagascar-Plan 1940-1942 (documents 97-107)
The first document is a letter of 24 June 1940 from Heydrich to foreign minister Ribbentrop. Heydrich writes that since taken charge of the central agency in January 1939, 200,000 Jews had emigrated from the German Reich. But the whole problem, 3 ¾ million Jews on territory under German control at this time (this following the Polish and French campaign, the latter virtually over with fighting officially stopped at 12:35 AM on 25 June 1940), can no longer be solved by emigration, a territorial final solution is therefore necessary. Heydrich asks Ribbentrop to please get involved in discussions re. the final solution of the Jewish problem. Nothing about mass murder here, even though the dreaded word “Endlösung”, final solution, is mentioned twice.
We then learn that it was Franz Rademacher, AA minister in department D III, who first suggested forced evacuation of Jews. On 2nd and 3rd July 1940, Rademacher presented his Madagascar plans: France has to make Madagascar available for Jewish settlement, the island to be under German administration (Mandat), not German territory, so as to prevent Jews from becoming German citizens. The Jews will however administer themselves, have their civic officials, police, postal service, etc. The term “Sonderlösung”(special solution) is mentioned, a term later interpreted as referring to murder. The next documents talks of geological issues and how to end Jewish influence in Germany by shipping them to Madagascar, but then, on 10 February 1942, Rademacher informs envoy Bielfeld of department Pol.X – the French resort – that the Führer has decided to drop Madagascar and send the Jews east instead. Here is the pertinent part of Rademacher’s letter to Bielfeld:
“[D]er Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion hat inzwischen die Möglichkeit gegeben, andere Territorien für die Endlösung zur Verfügung zu stellen. Demgemäß hat der Führer entschieden, daß die Juden nicht nach Madagaskar, sondern nach dem Osten abgeschoben werden sollen. Madagaskar braucht mithin nicht mehr für die Endlösung vorgesehen zu werden“. 
Just roughly: “The war with the Soviet Union has provided other possibilities to achieve the final solution. Thus the Führer has decided to not send the Jews to Madagascar but to the east instead. Madagascar should therefore no longer be considered for the final solution”. The term “Endlösung”, i.e., final solution used twice, with absolutely no murderous connotation.
Woermann, from the AA, then send a letter to Rademacher on 14 February 1942, writing that Bielfeld had informed him of the Führer’s decision to not send Jews to Madagascar, but east instead, asking Rademacher what source he bases this on, since this is of vital importance. Rademacher answered on 24 February 1942 that the Madagascar plan has been dropped, as outlined by Heydrich to secretary Luther, because of new developments. Rademacher has asked Luther to inform Woermann.
Amok run to the Wannsee conference 1941-1942 (documents 108-113)
(Amoklauf zur Wannsee-Konferenz)
This chapter starts with the well know letter from Göring to Heydrich of 31 July 1941, asking the latter to make preparations for a comprehensive solution of the Jewish question, concerning the Jews in German spheres of influence. This is followed by a letter of 4 November 1941, from Count Schwerin-Krosigk, ministry of finance, recipient unknown. The writer informs that in some cities, he names them, the deportation of Jews has already begun, Jews are allowed to take 50kg of luggage, as well as 100.00 Mark, with them. Then Vogel provides a record of decrees issued following Kristallnacht, listing all the prohibitions Jews had to endure. He copied this from Hans Lamm, Über die innere und äußere Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums im Dritten Reich, München 1951. This in an obvious attempt to distort the issue, to add some sinister meaning to it all, that sinister meaning not evident at all in the documents provided so far. And now a notice on an undated document by AA official Rademacher re. the “Wishes and ideas of the AA regarding the planned comprehensive solution of the Jewish question in Europe”: 1) Removal of all Jews in the German Reich, including Jews in Croatia, Slovakia and Romania. 2) Removal of all Jews who have lost their citizenship due to German occupation of their territory. On and on it goes, Serbian, Hungarian, Bulgarian Jews are to be removed, all in accord with the secret state police (he writes Geheime Staatspolizei instead of Gestapo). Then this again well known letter of 29 November 1941 by Heydrich to Luther, inviting him to a meeting at the international police office for 9 December 1941 at 12:00 noon with breakfast to follow. This letter is idiotic, Heydrich would never call a meeting of high official for 12:00 noon and offer breakfast at the conclusion. But all of this beside the point here, for now we have, as the last document, the minutes of the Wannsee meeting, the Wannsee Protokol, 30 copies distributed, this the 16. copy. Messrs. Bohlinger and Ney have shown that even though some parts of those minutes might be genuine, much of it makes no sense at all.
No case made for mass murder in this protocol, although this part of the Protokoll is peddled as “evidence:
“Under proper guidance, in the course of the final solution the Jews are to be allocated for appropriate labor in the East. Able-bodied Jews, separated according to sex, will be taken in large work columns to these areas for work on roads, in the course of which action doubtless a large portion will be eliminated by natural causes”.
Nothing wrong with the first sentence, evacuating Jews to the east had been discussed at that meeting, pending the Führer’s approval. But killing them by having them build roads in the east was never the plan, we are told that they were shot or killed in gas chambers.
This shows that the National Socialists made every effort to get rid of the Jews “in a legal manner”, as stated in the Wannsee Protokol. And according to said Protokol, 537,000 had been send out before the war started, despite the fact that no country was really willing to take in large numbers of Jews. Many moved to Palestine, and even though German officials wrote about the dangers for Germany should a Jewish state be created in Palestine, Hitler insisted on continued emigration. Was he not aware of the fact that every Jew allowed/encouraged to leave could turn into a potential enemy? Of course he was.
The forced emigration could be considered as being a moral issue, as for the legalities of it there is no doubt that Germany, as a sovereign nation, was within its right (see footnotes 44/45). When war broke out, and all those territories in eastern Europe were opened up, Hitler decided on the evacuation of Jews to those eastern territories to make Germany Judenfrei. This decision had been forced on him, because if other countries would have been willing to take in Jews, or if the Madagascar plan would have worked out, no doubt the eastern Jews, not needed for the war effort, would also have been send away. It is interesting to note that the Madagascar plan was only officially dropped in February 1942 (see footnotes 57,58,59), long after the order for the mass murder of Jews had allegedly been issued. In fact Hitler stated that he wished to have the Jewish issue “…postponed until after the war is over”.
There is absolutely no indication that Hitler turned into a mass murderer later, when he allowed Jews to emigrate before. Vogel tries hard to make that case, he starts out, on p.97, with some hearsay about what Hitler allegedly told Chvalkovsky (spelled Chalkovsky elsewhere), the Czech foreign minister on 21 January 1939, Hitler telling him that the Jews are being eliminated here. And that in January 1939, others also try to sell this nonsense. Then Vogel continues by telling us that when exactly the order for the Endlösung – the term now having a murderous intend – has been given, has not been recorded, he claims however that by 31 July 1941 it had already been issued. He continues by writing that there is some evidence that by March of 1941 Hitler had the order at the ready, Vogel provides no evidence whatever for either claim (p.97). We know however that the latest attempt to have the Jews removed had been initiated on 3 July 1940, when Rademacher introduced the German Madagascar Plan. That plan was dropped, because of the war with Russia, in February 1942. Somewhere in between Hitler decided to kill all Jews, or so Vogel, as well as “historians”, want us to believe.
As an aside: If the mass murder of Jews would have taken place, word of it would surely have gotten out, the whole world informed about it. This was not the case. In the latest, 2011, publication on the Holocaust, “Neue Studien zu Nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas”(New studies on National Socialist mass murder by poisonous gas) we read in the introduction, by Thomas Krüger (p.XI):
„Selbst als nach Kriegsende die Weltöffentlichkeit erfahren hatte, was in den Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslagern geschehen war, wurden Stimmen laut, die den Völkermord nicht wahrhaben wollten, ihn verdrängten oder gar leugneten“.
(Even when the world was informed, following the war, about what had happened in the concentration- and extermination camps, voices were heard dismissing this mass murder, some even denied it)
The operative words here are “Selbst nach Kriegsende”, following the war! With this the authors admit that nothing of substance was known during the war, confirming what others, Rothfels for one, wrote. And Vogel even provides some evidence, all be it inadvertently, that nothing was know. He talks, on pp.99/100, about a survey of students, ages 10-23, conducted 33 years after the war. The students had to provide answers to the question: “Was ich über Adolf Hitler gehört habe”(What I have heard about Adolf Hitler), here are some of the answers: “Hitler was a great personality in the German Reich, he helped Germany to get on its feet again”. “Hitler was strict, but all respected him…The neighbors wish that he was still here…He was also great during the war, his soldiers were brave…”. “As long as Hitler was in power there was quiet in Germany”. “Only once, and if for just a while, a little Hitler should return. We would then have no crimes, murders, robbers and no unemployed”.
Hmmm, nothing about the alleged Holocaust, even 33 years after the war, this survey giving Heinz Galinski, head of the Berlin Jewish community, conniptions. If the Holocaust would have happened, Germans would have found out about it and stopped it, just as they had stopped the euthanasia program before. But nothing was know, therefore only one conclusion is possible: There never was a “Holocaust”.
- Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel hat gefehlt. Dokumente zur Emigration deutscher Juden, Droemer Knaur, München/Zürich, 1977, pp.11-12
- Das Dritte Reich/Zweiter Weltkrieg, Heft 55, P.102
- Vogel, Ein Stempel…, p.25
- Dr. jur., Dr. phil., Dr. pol., Franz J. Scheidl, Deutschland und die Juden in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, II Teil, p.9
- Ibid, p.12
- Stéphane Courtois et al, The Black Book of Communism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England 1999, pp. 86, 96
- Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945, Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, Propyläen Verlag, 1987 Verlag Ullstein GmbH, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin, p. 139. Also pp.69-143
- Vogel, Ein Stempel…, pp.40/41
- Ibid, p.43
- Ingrid Weckert, The Emigration of the Jews from the Third Reich, http://codoh.com/viewpoints/vpauswanderung.html
- Vogel, Ein Stempel…, p.46
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.4, pp.110-123
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.5, pp.123/24
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.6, pp.124-126
- Ibid, attached to Dokument Nr.11, pp.134-138
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.19, pp.154/55
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.20, pp.155-157
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.21, pp.158/59
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.23, pp.161/62
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.24, p.163
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.25, p.164
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.27, pp.166/67
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.34, pp.172/73
- Ibid, attached to Dokument Nr.34, pp172-174
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.36, pp.176/77
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.37, pp.177/78
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.39, pp.180/81
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.40, pp.181/82
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.48, pp. 196-198
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.50, pp.199/200
- Ibid, Dokumente Nr.51, 52, 53, pp.200-204
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.54, pp.204-206
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.59, pp.212/13
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.60, pp.213-215
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.69, pp.221/22
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.70, pp.222/23
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.71, pp.224/25
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.73, p.227
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.58, pp.208-212
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.76, pp229-242. Tape recording by Mr. Rublee from the middle of the sixties; New York Columbia University, “Oral History”.
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.77, pp.242-246
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.78, pp.246-251
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.84, pp265-270
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.42, pp.186-190
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.44, pp.191-194
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.89, pp.283-289
- http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres6/WECKERTfeuer.pdf , for the English, abbreviated version http://vho.org/GB/Journals/JHR/6/2/Weckert183-206.html
- Vogel, Ein Stempel…, Dokument Nr.90, p.290
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.91, pp.290/91
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.92, pp.291-294
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.94, pp.296-303
- Walter Consuelo Langsam, PH.D., President Wagner College, The World Since 1914, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1952, p.770
- Vogel, Ein Stempel…”, Dokument Nr.97, pp.312/13
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.98, pp.313/14
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.99, pp.314-317
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.105, pp.334/35
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.106, p.335
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.107, pp.335/36
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.108, p.337
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.109, p.338
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.110, pp.338-341
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.111, pp.341/42
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.112, pp.342/43
- Ibid, Dokument Nr.113, pp.343-352
- transcript.htmlhttp://www.fpp.co.uk/Himmler/Schlegelberger/toLammers120342.html; http://www.fpp.co.uk/Himmler/Schlegelberger/DocItself0342.html